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Mittwoch, 13. März 2013

Grenada 25: EMTA is recommending that flat trading commence on March 13, 2013

As you may be aware, Grenada announced on March 8, 2013 that it will begin discussions with its creditors regarding a restructuring of its public debt, and confirmed that it will not have the resources to pay the interest payments on its 2025 bonds due on March 15 (nor does it expect to have the funds to do so within the relevant grace period). EMTA Members may access the full text of the Press Release by Clicking Hereor you may copy and paste the following link into your internet browser:
Accordingly, after consultations with major market participants, EMTA is recommending that flat trading commence on March 13, 2013 (unless otherwise agreed). EMTA Members may access the full text of the Market Practice recommendation by Clicking Here;or you may copy and paste the following link into your internet browser:
EMTA offers a wide range of Emerging Markets information. Please see our website at:

This e-mail was sent from EMTA, Trade Association For The Emerging Markets ( to

Ranking des Grenada 12 // sanfte pari passu clause ?

The notes will be general, direct, unconditional, unsubordinated and unsecured obligations of the
Government and will be backed by the full faith and credit of the Government. The notes will be Public
External Debt of the Government. The notes will rank equally among themselves and with all other
existing and future unsubordinated and unsecured Public External Debt of the Government.

Dienstag, 12. März 2013

Grenada 9.375 Grena12 Nts-S USP48863AA55 // ein pari passu play in New York ?

Guten Morgen Herr Koch
Gemäss Bondhandel stellt JP Morgen für eine Million USD folgende Preise; Bid 31 / Ask 54 (indikativ)
Bitte teilen Sie mir mit, ob ich einen Kaufauftrag im Markt platzieren soll.
Danke und einen guten Tag.
Freundliche Grüsse

NSIN:AT: 860920
CH: 1442330
Common: 015049251
DE: 860920
GB: 2962551
US: P48863AA5

Montag, 11. März 2013

Belize....schon wieder ein swap mit Einbussen...

March 8, 2013
Belize Debt Exchange Offer Successful
Belmopan, Belize: The Government of Belize announced
today that holders of 86.17 percent of the country's U.S. Dollar Bonds due
2029 (the “2029 Bonds”) had tendered their bonds in response to Belize's
February 15, 2013 offer to exchange those instruments for new Belize U.S.
Dollar Bonds due 2038 (the “2038 Bonds”). Belize's offer required tenders
to be submitted to Citibank, in its capacity as the Exchange Agent for the
transaction, by 5:00pm (New York time) today.
Under the terms of the 2029 Bonds and Belize's exchange
offer, holders of not less than 75 percent of the 2029 Bonds have instructed
the Trustee for those instruments to tender the entirety of the 2029 Bonds in
exchange for 2038 Bonds in accordance with the terms of Belize's offer.
The results of the tender process that ended today means that such an
exchange of the entirety of the 2029 Bonds is expected to take place at a
closing of the transaction later this month.
* * * *
Questions regarding this press release may be directed to
Joseph Waight, Financial Secretary (+501 822 0367);

Grenada 54 % nur noch 6 Mio ausstehend

Werter Herr Koch

Der Handel kann nur indikativ einen Kaufkurs von 54 geben, ob die Menge von 100‘000 verfügbar wäre, ist unsicher, da nur noch 6 Mio. ausstehend sind.

Ich hoffe, Ihnen damit dienen zu können und verbleibe mit freundlichen Grüssen

Sonntag, 10. März 2013

Handelseinstellung: USP48863AA55 Grenada, Government of... Grenada 16.02.2011 7823

Bekanntmachung Freiverkehr (Open Market)
Einstellung Anleihen
Kündigung der Einbeziehung und Einstellung der Preisfeststellung:
Nr. ISIN Börsen-
Name Land Letzter
1. XS0542650188 AIB Mortgage Bank Irland 16.02.2011 7637
2. CH0124138790 Pfandbriefbank schweizerischer
Schweiz 16.02.2011 7812
3. USP1330HAZ75 Banco Hipotecario S.A. Argentinien 16.02.2011 7823
4. XS0074563015 Buenos Aires, City of... Argentinien 16.02.2011 7823
5. USP48863AA55 Grenada, Government of... Grenada 16.02.2011 7823
6. USG9191BFV56 Unibanco - União de Bancos Brasileiros
Brasilien 16.02.2011 7823
7. DE000NLB5ME3 Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale Deutschland 16.02.2011 8710
8. DE000A1AZUQ7 Citigroup Funding Inc. USA 16.02.2011 8732
Frankfurt am Main, 16.02.2011
Deutsche Börse AG
Sollten Sie noch Fragen haben, wenden Sie sich bitte an:
If there are any questions, please contact:
Listing & Issuer Services 069 211 13555
Market Supervision 069 211 11050$File/Einstellung_Anleihen_FV_20110216.pdf?OpenElement

Donnerstag, 7. März 2013

Government of Grenada:2005-15.9.25 Reg S Step Up (UNSUBORDINATED)

Grenada 25 SU Reg S (DUS) - 15.09.2025  Price: 48 USD Chg. (in%): ±0 USD (±0.00%) Volume: -
Bonds:Government of Grenada:2005-15.9.25 Reg S Step Up (UNSUBORDINATED)
Symbol: Type:Floating Rate NoteIndustry:Länder/Zentralregierungen
Valor:2282281Domicile:GrenadaExchange:Boerse Dusseldorf AG

Klage Im-Ex-Bank-China v Grenada

Pari passu, the cross-sovereign contamination

Some excerpts from a lawsuit filed by the Export-Import Bank of China (Taipei) against Grenada in a United States district court on March 4, 2013…
If you have been following the pari passu saga on ratable payment of sovereign debt — they tell their own story. (Click to enlarge all images.)
1.) Ex-Im Bank already has a judgement on $32m of debt defaulted on by Grenada.
2.) The loan debt had a pari passu clause, and negative pledge language.
3.) Let’s just spell that last bit out, as cited by Ex-Im Bank.
According to their plain language, the pari passu clauses preclude Grenada from making a ratable payment to a holder of External Indebtedness without making a ratable payment at the same time to Ex-Im Bank.
4.) Ex-Im Bank stayed out of Grenada’s 2005 debt restructuring.
5.) It has been watching Grenada pay the people who did restructure.
6.) Bank of New York handled some of that dough. Bank of New York lives in New York.
7.) Ex-Im Bank is now coming after these payments to Grenada’s restructured bondholders. (Hello, intercreditor consequences of ratable payment.)
8.) And Ex-Im Bank’s citing equity.
They didn’t even wait for a final Second Circuit ruling on Argentina making ratable payments to its holdouts. (Why should they, actually? The implications of ratable payment are arguably clear.)
Incidentally observe point 1) there, that Ex-Im Bank is exploring this avenue having already won judgement against Grenada. (The story of their dispute is a long one.)
The $1.3bn of claims involved in NML’s pari passu litigation against Argentina were not judgement debts. Nevertheless. EM Ltd, which holds a prior judgement against Argentina, said (in a pro-holdout amicus brief) that while “the District Court has not yet been asked to address whether the Equal Treatment Provision can be used to enforce an existing judgment,” EM Ltd “believes that the Equal Treatment Provision applies with identical force in the post-judgment context”.
And now we have crossed into new territory.
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  1. Reportplasmaj | March 6 6:46pm | Permalink
    Except when they got their judgment they gave up their rights with respect to the bonds, including pari passu. Citi had a good piece explaining that.
  2. ReportJorge Marquez | March 6 7:31pm | Permalink
    Can you link that plasmaj? Or, at least, elaborate on what you just said. I'm intrigued...
  3. Reportanoldbanker | March 7 2:36pm | Permalink
    Argentina's equal treatment clause applies to payments; Grenada's only applies to ranking of the different debts. This is a critical distinction thoroughly discussed in academic analyses of pari passu.
  4. ReportJoseph Cotterill, FT | March 7 5:20pm | Permalink
    anoldbanker & plasmaj - Yep. Sure, it's not a particularly cast-iron case in itself (I think) because of the judgement issue and the lack of payments language. But it is striking and a sign of an important change that they thought they can even try.

Mittwoch, 6. März 2013

I can’t Belize it’s not ratable payment [updated]

I can’t Belize it’s not ratable payment [updated]

Update (Feb 26) – It turns out that we failed to be clear on something pretty important here… rendering our headline ironically pretty apt. Maybe you really can’tbelieve Belize’s disavowal of ratable payment on its bonds.
OK, so here’s the section on pari passu language in the new bonds’ Offering Memorandum:
“To ensure clarity on the point, Belize does not understand…” and so on.
Well, a couple of observers have pointed out to us that bondholders might not necessarily agree with Belize’s understanding. In other words, the disavowal might not protect Belize from legal challenge in the future, if it defaults on the new bonds. Why? Because Belize put the ratable payments disavowal in its offering memorandum — not in the actual contract for the new bonds. We should have made that clearer originally.
“Is that disavowal… important for the restructured creditors [to have]?,” we asked below. Well, no. They didn’t agree to put it into the contract, which is a sign that the bondholders didn’t agree with Belize’s interpretation in the first place, and did not wish to discard ratable payment.
That’s important to clear up, but it’s also interesting given what is really the most critical debate on obliging sovereigns to pay their bonds ratably.
The argument is about whether such an obligation can be inferred from a provision for equal treatment without the words ‘ratable payment’ having to be spelled out — or whether it needs sovereigns to issue debt with specific language attached. Beyond Belize, a case to consider might be Italy’s sale in 2010 of New York law debt with a promise to “pay amounts due… equally and ratably”.
At the same time, it’s worth noting that the Belize contract could arguably be called a ‘narrow’ pari passu clause because it talks about ‘ranking’ rather than ‘payment’ in terms of equal treatment. The offering memo itself has also come from a hotly-negotiated restructuring, emerging after extensive discussion on terms. But there’s a difference between a contract between two sides, and Belize’s interpretation of the contract given in an offering memo drawn up by its lawyers, or in a resolution of its own legislature.
We can also bring it back to events tomorrow in the Thurgood Marshall US courthouse, and whether Argentina has much chance convincing the Second Circuit. In October, the court agreed with a remedy of ratable payment for Argentina’s bond holdouts because it saw the dispute as a “simple question of contract interpretation.” Note the focus on contract.
Original post below the line.
It’s the week of the big hearing in the pari passu saga.
Argentina (plus the bondholders who agreed to be restructured between 2005 and 2010, plus Bank of New York) will try to convince the Second Circuit that it should change an order for the country to pay holdouts ratably as a remedy for breaching their bond contract‘Ratable’ is a term with a controversial history in sovereign debt but it basically means paying each creditor on the same basis, not paying one after the other.
Well, speaking of ratable payment… we’d just like to point something out from the Belize debt restructuring, which has been going on while the pari passu saga has trundled through courts:
Status of the New Bonds
The New Bonds will be general, direct, unconditional, unsubordinated and unsecured obligations of Belize and will rank at least equally among themselves and with all of Belize’s existing and future unsecured and unsubordinated indebtedness (it being understood that this equal ranking status shall not require Belize to pay all items of its bond indebtedness on a ratable basis).
A mere sub-clause, but what a sub-clause.
That wording comes from the Belize National Assembly’s resolution, passed this month, which authorises the government to issue new debt to bondholders. It includes the bonds’ basic terms and conditions (unfortunately the full Offering Memorandum itself is hard to track down — the offer period is still open), but it’s really that direct disavowal of ratable payment which is special.
Particularly in this restructuring.
Belize could have ended up as a pretty acrimonious default. It started out as one: the government played hardball last year, through missing a coupon payment on its $550m ‘Superbond’ — the result of its last debt restructuring, back in 2007 — and generally just not being nice to its creditors. The mood got better after the creditors formed a committee, allowing everyone to sit down to argue about economic projections and the chances of debt repayment.
Still, while Belize’s offer will be getting the acceptance it needs, the bond terms appear to contain some fairly innovative protections to make sure Belize can’t play hardball again. Joe Kogan of Scotiabank has observed that creditors get to claw back the 10 per cent reduction in bond principal which they’ve agreed to, if Belize fails to make a payment within the next decade. There also seems to be an account set aside for paying the expenses of a future creditor committee. As Kogan also notes, these protections could ultimately depend on being able to attach Belizean assets to force these payments — c’est la vie when litigating against a sovereign — but they’re nice to have.
So in this context Belize says that it doesn’t consider itself to have an obligation to pay ratably under these bonds. Is that disavowal important for Belize to have? Or important for the restructured creditors? Will it in some way shape the legacy of the pari passu saga?
Sovereign debt restructurings don’t come around very often, even these days. The new Belize bonds come five months after the Second Circuit first confirmed ratable payment for Argentina’s holdouts, making them (we think) the first debt exchange to react to the court’s decision. Some sovereigns have since sold New York law bondswarning that the Argentine litigation has now created legal risk within pari passu clauses, but unlike Belize they didn’t go into the weeds of ratable payment.
Maybe its disavowal means the Second Circuit really should revisit the Argentine order after all.
But then Argentina has previously argued to courts that no sovereign debtor in its right mind would ever agree to ratable payment, given the power it would give to holdouts. Is that right? The Belizean rewrite suggests that sovereigns do recognise the ratable implications of a promise to pay pari passu, and that they can easily adapt bond contracts to shut those implications down. Even in a sovereign restructuring. Or, rather, especially in a sovereign restructuring.